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Abstract 
 
This article articulates a mystically motivated apophatic subjectivity that emerges from 
Simone Weil’s life and thought. It does so genealogically, via excursions into Pseudo-
Dionysius’s and Meister Eckhart’s negative theologies. These genealogical excursions 
expose Weil’s resonances with and differences from these earlier thinkers of Chris-
tian apophasis. To highlight these differences, this article pays particular attention to two 
spiritual exercises, attention and decreation, which when taken together point out a tragic 
sense pulsing through and informing Weil’s remarkable religious thought and praxis. 
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The spiritual itinerary of Simone Weil—philosopher, political activist, 
and religious mystic—moves according to a mystic impulse, as she feels 
 
 * I owe thanks to Thomas Carlson for his comments on an earlier version of this text 
and to Duane Williams and two anonymous reviewers for Medieval Mystical Theology, 
whose thoughtful readings and helpful suggestions immeasurably improved what follows. 
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herself lovingly advancing toward the utterly unknowable.1 Her spiritual 
itinerary aims at something unknowable, propelled by a spiritual desire 
for passage, for a crossing beyond the limits of human experience. This 
crossing involves an expenditure of self in the form of a powerful love that 
seizes this subject—an expenditure that comes at the price of subjectivity. 
In this way, her spiritual itinerary calls for and culminates in an apophatic 
subjectivity: a subjectivity that undoes itself, out of love and an ardent 
hope for mystical passage across the threshold of experience. 
 To flesh out this apophatic subjectivity, I set Weil in conversation with 
Pseudo-Dionysius and Meister Eckhart, two medieval mystical Christian 
thinkers (both of whom are, like Weil, deeply influenced by Platonism 
and Neoplatonism) who articulate apophatic theologies that resonate with 
and, I think, illuminate Weil’s and the mystical impulse at its heart. My 
motivation for doing so is genealogical, as a way of tracking resonances of 
Weil’s thought with a genealogy of Christian apophasis and, in the process, 
of performatively proposing an apophatic genealogy in which to regard 
Weil’s writings—an alternative genealogy from those philosophical gene-
alogies in which scholars tend to locate her, one that highlights aporias 
and impossibilities as well as motions between, toward, and into the 
unknown.2 
 Reading Weil’s œuvre with an ear for resonances with Dionysius’s 
apophatic theology and Eckhart’s apophatic anthropology also highlights 
the dissonances between Weil’s thought and theirs. While the resonances 
indicate where the medieval and the modern touch and even cross, the 
dissonances (1) reiterate that Weil’s engagement with medieval apophatic 
 
 1. For two recent introductions to Weil’s life and thought, see Yourgrau, P., 2011, and 
Plant, S., 2007. For a systematic and periodized treatment of Weil’s writings, see Ross, M., 
2003. 
 2. While many scholars read Weil as a mystical Christian Platonist, I suggest inverting 
the order of these terms and reading her as a Platonic Christian mystic—which could as 
easily and as effectively describe Dionysius or Eckhart—for the mystical dimensions of her 
thought are most distinctive and most provocative. For readings of Weil along the lines of 
mystical Christian Platonism, see Springsted, E., 1983; and Doering, E., and Springsted, E., 
2004. Springsted, like many scholars, sees Weil’s Platonic affiliation as definitive. But such 
a reading risks a reductionism, according to a logic of ‘it all goes back to Plato’—a reduc-
tionism that effaces the originality of Weil’s work. Moreover, it reads her famous assertion 
that ‘Plato is an authentic mystic and even the father of Occidental mysticism’ in a way 
that collapses the mystical within the Platonic (seemingly via the Neoplatonic), whereas I 
read this assertion as a testament to the crucial position of mysticism in her work. For 
other readings of Weil’s mysticism, see the 2006 proceedings of the American Weil 
Society’s Colloquy 26, ‘Simone Weil and Mysticism’. 
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theologies is a creative and felicitous, rather than “faithful,” one and 
(2) point toward distinctive elements of Weil’s thought and practice. 
Among these distinctive elements are the twin peaks of Weil’s mystical 
itinerary, affliction and decreation, with the former tingeing her ultimate 
decreative apophasis with a tragic sense. Because Weil’s spiritual program 
entwines a tragic sense with an apophatic praxis, it sets hers apart from 
apophatic predecessors (including Dionysius and Eckhart) in provocative 
ways that ultimately produce a reframing of Christianity in relation to 
tragedy. This tragic element is made tragic by excessive desire—one that 
infuses Weil’s life and thought—for what remains impossible, across the 
threshold.3 
 Understanding the compelling power of this double climax—of afflic-
tion and decreation as the zeniths of Weil’s spiritual itinerary—requires 
understanding the path along which a spiritual itinerant advances. That 
path comprises a progressive arrangement of ascetic exercises whose 
performance enacts a subjective apophasis. Engendering and supporting 
this subjective apophasis is a theological apophasis, crystallized in Weil’s 
quintessentially apophatic assertion that ‘all affirmations, on the subject of 
God, have as their true senses negations’.4 Absence and negation are the 
apex of her tragic Christian sensibility, according to which God exists in 
creation only via a void, only as an absence: ‘God can be present in crea-
tion only under the form of absence’.5 Similarly, human language can 
express what is supreme by negation, which points to a divine negativity 
that Weil conceives in terms of an originary void—‘the void is God, the 
void is primordial’—which demonstrates the radically negative dimension 
of her theological vision.6 
 
 
 3. For related readings of tragedy in Weil’s writings, see Tracy, D., 1999; and Leithart, 
P., 2004, For a treatment of tragedy and Christianity, see Hunt, B., 1985. I have considered 
tragedy and Christianity in Robert, W., 2010, esp. pp. 88-102. 
 4. Weil, S., 1988–, 6.2.482; see also 6.2.318 and 6.2.358. This and subsequent citations 
of Weil’s Oeuvres complètes (according to tome, volume, and page numbers) are from 
Weil’s cahiers, a series of personal notebooks that she kept between 1933 and 1942. All 
translations of Weil’s writings are my own. 
 5. Ibid., 6.3.105; see also 6.2.105. 
 6. Ibid., 6.2.68. This quotation already signals a potential dissonance between Weil 
and Eckhart, for while void might ‘be’ (an image of) God in Weil’s theology, it might not 
be in Eckhart’s, since his apophasis rejects all images, including negative ones—which, on 
some accounts, might make his apophasis more radical than hers. 
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Apophatic Theology: Dionysius  
Theologically as well as experientially, negativity indicates a void, an abyss 
of emptiness, a dark night. This negativity finds expression theologically 
and experientially in apophasis, which means un-saying or speaking-away 
and moves via negation. It names a mode of ineffable discourse based on 
aporia, one traditionally paired with kataphasis, or affirmation, saying, 
speaking-with. As Michael Sells points out, ‘every act of saying [or unsay-
ing] demands or presupposes a previous saying’.7 Apophasis is language 
turning back upon itself and undoing itself, unraveling a prior statement, 
but this unraveling constitutes a saying that must in turn be unsaid. 
Hence apophasis and kataphasis exist in mutual interdependence, with 
apophasis indicating a linguistic performance.8 
 In Christian traditions, apophasis is often related to or called negative 
theology (making kataphasis affirmative theology by implication), insofar 
as, Sells writes, apophasis ‘denies that the transcendent can be named or 
given attributes’.9 Its theological importance, then, is that it leaves God 
ultimately ineffable, for as a way of using language, apophasis dislodges 
any foundations for language. Through apophasis, theology is left 
ungrounded; theology undoes itself, as it speaks by unspeaking and moves 
by way of negation—the via negativa—toward an unnamable transcend-
ence. Sells suggests three identifying elements of Western apophatic 
discourse: ‘(1) the metaphor of overflowing or “emanation,” which is 
often in creative tension with the language of intentional, demiurgic 
creation; (2) dis-ontological discursive effort to avoid reifying the trans-
cendent as an “entity” or “being” or “thing”; (3) a distinctive dialectic of 
transcendence and immanence in which the utterly transcendent is 
revealed as the utterly immanent’.10 
 
 7. Sells, M., 1994, p. 3; see also pp. 207-209, where Sells helpfully outlines principles of 
apophatic language. 
 8. Given this article’s constraints, I am unable to unpack fully the performative dimen-
sions of apophasis, particularly in Dionysius’s and Eckhart’s theologies. That Dionysius 
opens his Mystical Theology with a prayer-poem and then structures the subsequent text as 
a didactic epistle offers two examples of the rhetorical strategies he employs to perform his 
theological apophasis—rhetorical strategies that serve as integral components of apophatic 
operations. I thank an anonymous reviewer for reminding me of this point. For explora-
tions of apophatic performances in embodied directions, see Boesel, C., and Keller, C., 
2009. 
 9. Sells, M., 1994, p. 2. 
 10. Ibid., p. 6. 
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 These elements appear exemplarily in the texts of the author writing as 
Dionysius the Areopagite, known as Pseudo-Dionysius, who, more than 
any other author, opens the Christian tradition of negative and mystical 
theologies.11 For example, he announces at the outset of his Divine Names 
that ‘we must not dare to resort to words or conceptions concerning that 
hidden divinity which transcends being’, for no words can ‘come up to 
this inexpressible Good, this One, this Source of all unity, this supra-
existent Being’.12 No, this Good or One or Source or Being remains ‘not 
only invisible and incomprehensible but also “unsearchable and inscruta-
ble.”’13 Dionysius thus engages in apophasis as, according to Denys 
Turner, ‘the linguistic strategy of somehow showing by means of language 
that which lies beyond language’ and the epistemological strategy of 
human unknowing regarding the nature of God.14 Dionysius uses symbols 
as analogies, allowing him to ‘approach the ray which transcends being’ 
and which ‘neither intelligence nor speech can lay hold of nor can it at all 
be contemplated since it surpasses everything’.15 God, therefore, is not a 
thing, and Dionysius can say nothing about God (who is nothing), which 
leaves praise as the only available discourse.16 
 
 11. My reading of Dionysius here remains truncated and tactical. For careful and 
considered treatments of Dionysian thought, including a helpful account of its influences 
in medieval and modern contexts, see Stang, C., 2012; Carlson, T., 1999, pp. 155-70; and 
Coakley, S., and Stang, C., 2009. For an examination of negative theology’s place in the 
Dionysian corpus, see Golitzin, A., 2003. 
 12. Dionysius, 1987, 49/588A, 49/588B. This and subsequent citations of Dionysius’s 
writings give page numbers in the Complete Works followed by the standard pagination 
from J.P. Migne’s Patrologiae Cursus Completus, Series Graeca III (1857). 
 13. Dionysius, 1987, 50/588C. 
 14. Turner, D., 1995, p. 34, original emphasis. To illustrate this latter point, Turner 
points to Nicholas of Cusa, who develops a doctrine of docta ignorantia (learned igno-
rance). See Nicholas, 1997, pp. 85-206. 
 15. Dionysius, 1987, 53/592D. 
 16. Doing so allows Dionysius to elude the traps of any kataphatic predications of the 
divine and to participate instead in a linguistic economy of giving whose offerings reflect 
the unnamability of the divine that lies hidden beyond thought and beyond being. Such 
an economy of giving—and the figure of the gift more generally—has received much 
attention from recent readers of Christian apophasis. For a theology centered on donation, 
see Marion, J.-L., 1991, pp. 161-82. For a provocative reading of Marion’s theology, see 
Derrida, J., 1992. Carlson critically compares these two philosophers on the gift in 
Carlson, T., 1999, pp. 190-236. 
118 Medieval Mystical Theology 21.1 (2012) 
© Equinox Publishing Ltd 2012 
 Divine Names proceeds according to an apophatic logic of denial, 
progressively demonstrating that God is beyond names, ‘more than 
ineffable and more than unknowable’.17 The most important name that 
Dionysius considers is ‘Good’ because it points to the processions of God 
as ‘the transcendentally good cause of all good things’.18 This notion of 
cause relates to the apophatic movement of ascension through denial, 
according to which even ‘Good’ must eventually fall away as an unsuitable 
name for the divine, for which ‘there is no name…or expression’.19 The 
way of apophasis, the ‘way up through negations’, is the way to mystical 
theology, leading ‘higher than any being, / any divinity, any goodness’.20 
In its opening prayer-poem, Mystical Theology offers a call of praise to the 
Trinity so that it might: 
 
Lead us up beyond unknowing and light, 
up to the farthest, highest peak 
of mystic scripture, 
where the mysteries of God’s Word 
lie simple, absolute and unchangeable 
in the brilliant darkness of a hidden silence.21 
 
This prayer-poem, which Turner calls a ‘self-subverting utterance’, says 
and unsays in the same stroke, thereby demonstrating the linguistic 
movement of apophasis.22 But how is the utterance self-subverting, so as 
to say and unsay simultaneously? The paradoxical or oxymoronic term 
‘brilliant darkness’ contains an affirmation, implying that ‘God is bril-
liant’, and a negation, that ‘God is darkness’. In that these are said 
together as metaphors, they each serve to subvert the other, as brilliance 
and darkness cannot logically co-exist. In this manner, the affirmation is 
denied by the negation, while the negation is likewise denied by the 
affirmation. This effects not only the negation of the affirmation but also 
the negation of the negation. Apophasis therefore includes the movements 
 
 
 17. Dionysius, 1987, 61/640D. 
 18. Dionysius, 1987, 96/816B. 
 19. Dionysius, 1987, 129/981A. 
 20. Dionysius, 1987, 130/981B, 135/997A. Paul Rorem recalls in his notes to Mystical 
Theology that both ‘mystic’ and ‘mysterious’ are translations of mustikos in the sense of 
something mysterious, secret, or hidden. This linguistic link helps to illustrate the hidden-
ness of God in apophatic discourse as both ‘negative’ and ‘mystical’. See Dionysius, 1987, 
p. 135 n. 2. 
 21. Dionysius, 1987, 135/997A-B.  
 22. Turner, D., 1995, p. 21. 
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of negation and of the negation of negation, as ‘the brilliant darkness of a 
hidden silence’ exquisitely demonstrates: this seeming oxymoron shows 
itself by not showing itself—or by showing itself to be unshowable, to be 
beyond showability. 
 Apophasis advances toward this beyond since it advances, Dionysius 
writes, ‘toward union with him who is beyond all being and knowledge’.23 
Such an advance requires ‘an undivided and absolute abandonment of 
yourself and everything’ so as to ‘be uplifted to the ray of the divine 
shadow which is above everything that is’.24 He finally plunges into the 
‘brilliant darkness’ that is neither darkness nor light but beyond both, in 
the realm of unseeing and unknowing (beyond all seeing and all know-
ing)—the destination toward which apophasis moves, for ‘the more we 
take flight upward, the more our words are confined to the ideas we are 
capable of forming; so that now as we plunge into that darkness which is 
beyond intellect, we shall find ourselves not simply running short of 
words but actually speechless and unknowing’.25 
 By Mystical Theology’s final chapter, Dionysius writes only according to 
a ‘neither…nor’ formula, culminating in the negation of negation: God as 
supreme cause ‘falls neither within the predicate of nonbeing nor of 
being… There is no speaking of it, nor name nor knowledge of it. Dark-
ness and light, error and truth—it is none of these. It is beyond assertion 
and denial’.26 Here Dionysius reaches the mystical pinnacle of his theol-
ogy, the ecstatic moment that passes beyond as a hyper-unsaying—a 
moment linked to moments of giving, in which Dionysius describes the 
divine’s overflowing gift: ‘the cause of all things is himself overflowing 
with them in one transcendent excess of all’.27 
 
 23. Dionysius, 1987, 135/997B. This beyond corresponds to the rhetorical strategy of 
‘neither…nor’ that characterizes apophasis, which in theological terms yields a statement 
following the formula ‘God is neither x nor not x because God is beyond x’. 
 24. Dionysius, 1987, 135/1000A. 
 25. Dionysius, 1987, 139/1033B. 
 26. Dionysius, 1987, 141/1048A-B, my italics. 
 27. Dionysius, 1987, 127/972A. Here, Dionysius brings together Christological and 
Neoplatonic dimensions of his thought, through which he treats the dialectic of transcen-
dence and immanence that Sells describes: Dionysius’s God is transcendent in and through 
immanence and immanent in and through transcendence. These Christological and 
Neoplatonic strands are woven together by a logos that follows a logic of procession and 
return. In a Christological direction, Marion explores Christ’s donation of body and blood 
on the cross, indexed and re-presented in the Eucharist, according to agapē; he extends 
Bonaventure’s insight, writing that ‘a properly theological gaze considers the eucharistic 
present…as gift that itself is given as mystical’. See Marion, J.-L., 1991, p. 180. In a 
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Apophatic Anthropology: Meister Eckhart 
 
Dionysius’s plunge into ‘brilliant darkness’ signals an ecstatic movement 
involved in mystical union: the dispossession of self that implicitly 
involves a negation. As Thomas Carlson describes, ‘in the mystical move-
ment of negation, the removal and abandonment of all beings goes hand 
in hand with the abandonment or dispossession of self. Theological 
apophasis goes together with an anthropological apophasis’.28 To explore 
this anthropological apophasis, I turn to the sermons of Meister Eckhart, 
whose anthropology stems from his theology—which, like Dionysius’s, is 
apophatic and Neoplatonic. Eckhart’s God is ‘wholly empty and free’, 
beyond saying, beyond understanding, ‘neither being nor goodness’.29 
God remains hyper-negative, ‘a negation of negation’, ‘a light to which 
there is no access’.30 
 God is, for Eckhart, an overflowing (ebullitio), a bursting forth, a move-
ment from God to a soul and from a soul to God without any mediation: 
‘just as he breaks through me, I break through him in return’.31 The 
Neoplatonic element of procession and return comes in four parts. In 
terms of procession (exitus), bullitio corresponds to the inner emanation 
of the Trinitarian Persons, and ebullitio corresponds to the act of creation. 
In terms of return (reditus), the Word is born in the soul, and the soul 
bursts into the divine ground, where it can be ‘free of “God.”’32 Freedom 
from ‘God’ underscores Eckhart’s apophaticism, in which God is ineffable, 
unspeakable, beyond names. 
 
Neoplatonic direction, Paul Rorem, in his introduction to Pseudo-Dionysius’s Complete 
Works (1987), makes particular reference to the Celestial Hierarchy and the triple move-
ment of proceeding, returning, and remaining. See also Carlson, T., 1999, pp. 157-70. 
 28. Carlson, T., 1999, p. 188. My reading of Eckhart, like my reading of Dionysius, is 
truncated and tactical. For fuller treatments of Eckhart’s thought, see Caputo, J., 1978; 
Davies, O., 1991; McGinn, B., 2002; and Tobin, F., 1986. 
 29. Eckhart, M., 1981, 180/2; 1986, 257/9. This and subsequent citations of Eckhart’s 
sermons give page numbers in the relevant volume followed by the sermon number. This 
statement points to a divide between Dionysius and Eckhart. Though both recognize the 
namelessness of God, Dionysius sees Goodness as the last divine name standing, while for 
Eckhart the last name is Being. Hence Eckhart reverses Thomas Aquinas’s ontotheological 
naming of God (‘esse est deus’). For more on esse in Eckhart, see Eckhart., M., 1986, 15-30, 
as well as McGinn, B., 2002, pp. 93-99. 
 30. Eckhart, M., 1986, 281/21, 320/71. 
 31. Ibid., 288/29. 
 32. Eckhart, M., 1981, 200/52; see also 204/52. 
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 In addition, God is uncreated, which allows passage from theology to 
anthropology, from God to a soul, from exitus to reditus. The key to this 
passage is ‘ground [grunt]’, by which Eckhart means the innermost and 
highest part of the soul, which he names metaphorically as a ‘little town 
[bürgelîn]’: 
 
This little town…is in the soul so one and so simple, far above whatever can be 
described… This little town is so truly one and simple, and this simple one is 
so exalted above every manner and every power, that no power, no manner, 
not God himself may look at it… God himself never for an instant looks into 
it, never yet did he look on it, so far as he possesses himself in the manner and 
according to the properties of his Persons. It is well to observe this, because 
this simple one is without manner and without properties. And therefore, if 
God were ever to look upon it, that must cost him all his divine names and the 
properties of his Persons; that he must wholly forsake, if he is ever once to look 
into it.33 
 
This little town stands above description, above entry or gaze—even by 
God. If God wishes to look in, God must undergo the most rigorous 
apophatic stripping so that God sheds the possibility of being named. 
Hence the ground of the soul, like the apophatic God, remains,34 above 
and beyond language, for it, like God, remains uncreated and thus beyond 
language. This utterly simple ground of the soul is, Eckhart describes, a 
‘simple silence’, a ‘quiet desert’, a place ‘where no one dwells’ and where 
‘the soul’s naked being finds the naked, formless being of the divine unity, 
which is there a being above being’.35 There, the uncreated soul can 
understand God without mediation: uncovered, naked, exposed. 
 Eckhart uses the metaphor of the little town to illustrate this identity of 
God’s ground and the soul’s ground: ‘here God’s ground is my ground, 
and my ground is God’s ground’.36 This identity exists thanks to their 
uncreatedness, which allows the soul to remain (like God) in utter sim-
plicity, beyond predication, and to belong instead to a mystical order 
beyond affirmation and denial. God and the soul exist as esse indistinctum, 
allowing the soul to remark, ‘God’s existence must be my existence and 
 
 33. Ibid., 181/2; see also 198/48; 1986, 257/9 and 288/29; and Milem, B., 2002. 
 34. Here I use ‘remains’ in the Neoplatonic sense according to the logic of processing, 
returning, remaining. 
 35. Eckhart, M., 1981, 198/48, 206/83. 
 36. Ibid., 183/5b. McGinn considers ground in semantic and theological terms in 
McGinn, B., 2002, pp. 35-52 and 114-61. 
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God’s is-ness is my is-ness’.37 God and the soul exist without any medium, 
outflowing and inflowing and overflowing. 
 In the soul’s innermost ground, which is identical with God’s ground, 
God continually gives birth to the Word, the Son. For Eckhart, this con-
stant birth is God’s self-revelation, meaning that ‘there in the soul God is 
made known to God’.38 There, in the uncreated ground that God and the 
soul share, God speaks Godself in the Word. For the soul to share this 
ground, it must be completely detached from creation.39 The process of 
detachment (abgescheidenheit)—metaphysical, ethical, and mystical—
aims, in Bernard McGinn’s words, at ‘detaching, cutting off, leaving, 
letting go, resigning, unforming, un-becoming’.40 This requires that it 
become inwardly poor in spirit, leaving it wanting nothing, knowing 
nothing, having nothing, willing and longing for nothing. Turner 
describes detachment as ‘a complete self-emptying…the digging out of a 
void, an abyss within the self, a vacuum into which God is inevitably 
drawn’—a description that highlights Eckhart’s spiritual and anthropo-
logical apophasis, making detachment ‘the ascetic practice of the 
apophatic’.41 Detachment, as a practice, aims at ‘the transformation of 
experience’.42 
 To achieve such perfect detachment requires an annihilation of self. 
The soul must sacrifice itself to God, paralleling God’s self-sacrifice in 
Christ’s crucifixion: according to Eckhart, ‘God died so that I might die to 
the whole world and to all created things’.43 Only then is an annihilated 
subject ‘really like God’: only when the soul turns in on itself, retreating to 
its uncreated ground, does it become ‘receptive to nothing except God’.44 
Then, thanks to detachment, the soul compels God to love it (just as God 
compels the soul to love God) by issuing a silent call to God from within 
the darkness of its uncreated ground—a call to which God must respond. 
 
 
 37. Eckhart, M., 1981, 187/6. Turner extends this remark, via bullitio, to suggest that 
the soul was in the Godhead before it was ever created: ‘before I was created I was 
uncreated’ (Turner, D., 1995, p. 145). 
 38. Eckhart, M., 1986, 243/1; see also 301/40. 
 39. McGinn points out that detaching, birthing, and breaking through are inextricably 
linked as the three central activities in the process of return (McGinn, B., 2002, p. 132). 
 40. Ibid., p. 133; see also Dobie, R., 2002. 
 41. Turner, D., 1995, pp. 172, 179. 
 42. Ibid., p. 179, emphasis original; see also Kelly, C.F., 1977. 
 43. Eckhart, M., 1986, 289/29. 
 44. Eckhart, M., 1981, 286. 
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This apophatics of desire achieves, at the pinnacle of detachment, a 
unified, uncreated interiority that compels God to come inside and to 
remain.45 
*** 
 
Returning to Weil does not mean traveling far from Eckhart since, as 
McGinn notes, someone studying Eckhart’s apophasis should keep in 
mind ‘the absolute identity in the one ground that annihilating detach-
ment creates, or perhaps better, borrowing a word from Simone Weil, 
“decreates.”’46 Eckhart’s detachment (abgescheidenheit) and Weil’s 
decreation (décréation) resonate in this way, which makes sense given that 
Weil includes Eckhart in a list of medieval theologians she regards as 
important—a list that includes Peter Abelard, Thierry of Chartres, John of 
Salisbury, Alain of Lille, Hugh of St. Victor, Bonaventure of Bagnoregio, 
Angelus Silesius, and Giordano Bruno.47 She refers to Eckhart as she 
elaborates this point: 
 
The sole part of our soul for which it is not suitable that it be subject to afflic-
tion is that which is situated in the other world. Affliction does not have power 
over it—because perhaps, as Meister Eckhart says, it is uncreated—but it has 
the power to separate it violently from the temporal part of the soul, so that, 
although supernatural love resides in the soul, sweetness is not experienced by 
it. It is thus that the cry arises: ‘My God, why have you abandoned me?’48 
 
 45. ‘Apophatics of desire’ points to (1) the apophaticism of desire that Turner 
describes, through which a human subject comes to live ‘without a why’, and (2) a move-
ment of desire through apophasis, thanks to which a detached soul can receive the gift of 
divine erōs in union with God. For an expanded reading of erōs vis-à-vis medieval 
Christian mysticism, see Jantzen, G., 2003. 
 46. McGinn, B., 2002, p. 138. For a different perspective on Weil’s theological anthro-
pology set amid a different historical genealogy, see Vogel, J., 2008. Moreover, proximity 
still implies distance, so while Eckhart focuses on God, Weil concentrates on the affliction 
of a soul as it journeys toward God. Similarly, while for Eckhart union with God is an act 
of God’s knowing Godself in the soul, for Weil the remaining ‘unknowing’ of God for the 
soul is premised on an understanding of the soul as the agent of knowing. But for Eckhart 
the soul is not an agent of knowing, because God cannot be known as an entity distinct 
from God’s knowing Godself. I thank an anonymous review for this point. 
 47. Weil, S., 1988–, 6.3.393. This list points to an interesting parallel in Bonaventure 
and Eckhart: both describe Christ as being uncreated. See Bonaventure, 1987, p. 170. 
Eckhart appears again in the closing pages of this cahier, where Weil cites a fragment from 
one of his sermons on Matthew (concerning the trustworthy servant in Matthew 25.23): 
‘as long as there is a single man whom you love less than yourself, you have never loved 
yourself… Never more did he evoke either himself or any other created thing with his 
created will’ (Weil, S., 1988–, 6.3.423). 
 48. Weil, S., 1950, p. 85. 
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This passage is worth dwelling on, as it succinctly articulates Weil’s 
proximity to and distance from Eckhart’s apophatic anthropology. Weil 
maintains, with Eckhart, that at least one part of the soul—the locus of 
‘supernatural love’—is uncreated (and thus atemporal), which allows for 
the identity of the soul’s ground and God’s ground (recalling Eckhart’s 
‘God’s ground is my ground, and my ground is God’s ground’) experi-
enced in and through detachment, that apophatic process of unforming, 
unbecoming, undoing. Decreation is, for Weil, just that kind of apophatic 
process through which a human subject detaches and undoes herself. 
Decreation is the ascetic practice of apophasis that concerns the soul’s 
uncreated part, the part Eckhart calls the innermost ground, though what 
Eckhart calls a retreat (of the soul into this innermost ground) Weil sees 
as a passage: a mystical passage from the created to the uncreated. In 
decreation, a human subject passes via negation ‘into the uncreated’.49 
 At this point, the resonances between Eckhart’s detachment and Weil’s 
decreation are, as McGinn mentions, so deep that decreation seems to be 
nearly a translation of detachment. Further deepening these resonances 
are the respective imports of the crucifixion for detachment and 
decreation. For Eckhart, the crucifixion opens the way of detachment and 
all that it entails (‘God died so that I might die to the whole world and to 
all created things’). For Weil, decreation is from the start bound to the 
cross, as it makes its first appearance in Weil’s cahiers in reference to the 
cross: ‘Cross. Only extreme affliction fully brings redemptive suffering. It 
is therefore necessary that it be so that the creature can be decreated’.50 
The similarities are striking. 
 
 
Apophatic Precursor: Affliction 
 
But these similarities also expose dissimilarities. As the passage above 
illustrates, decreation is only half of the story for Weil. The other half is 
 
 49. Weil, S., 1988–, 6.2.349-50. 
 50. Ibid., 6.2.363. Quite provocatively, Julia Kristeva finds a similar move in Martin 
Luther. In a section entitled ‘The Protestant Affliction’ amid her consideration of Holbein’s 
The Body of the Dead Christ in the Tomb, Kristeva writes that ‘as early as his Ninety-Five 
Theses against indulgences, Martin Luther formulated a mystical call for suffering as a 
means of access to heaven’ (Kristeva, J., 1989, p. 120). To support her claim, she points to 
theses four, seven, forty, and ninety-four. Her point resonates in very interesting ways with 
Weil’s thoughts on affliction as part of a mystical route, though she seems to forget that in 
1517, when Luther wrote the Ninety-Five Theses, he was still an Augustinian monk and 
not yet a self-consciously unorthodox ‘reformer’. 
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affliction (malheur), a spiritual exercise that precedes decreation—and 
introduces a profoundly tragic dimension into Weil’s mystical program, 
one that ultimately marks her Christianity as fundamentally tragic. Since 
affliction precedes and makes way for decreation, understanding the latter 
requires understanding the former. While decreation affects a soul’s 
uncreated part, affliction affects its created, temporal part—or, more 
specifically, affliction has (returning to the passage above) ‘the power to 
separate it [the soul’s uncreated part] violently from the temporal part of 
the soul’, and that separation is what allows decreation to proceed. 
Phrased differently, affliction is the suffering that precedes the ‘sweetness’ 
of ‘supernatural love’. 
 But affliction is not simply suffering. It is a profound, unique suffer-
ing—one that is, according to Weil, ‘in the domain of suffering…a thing 
apart, specific, irreducible’, since it involves ‘an uprooting of life, a more 
or less attenuated equivalent of death’.51 Affliction deracinates a human 
subject as such totally: as Weil writes, it attacks and arrests life ‘directly or 
indirectly in all its parts, social, psychological, physical’, thereby robbing a 
subject of her very subjectivity.52 Affliction makes a subject (a ‘who’) into 
a thing (a ‘what’), thanks to a violence: affliction, lacerating this human 
subject with the blade of the impossible, effects an experience of violence 
that, though specific, cannot be put into words by this eviscerated subject-
turned-thing. Affliction is excessive; it is impossible; it is absurd. It marks 
a limit across which a human subject experiences something of the 
impossible, for (in Weil’s words) ‘affliction compels one to recognize as 
real what one does not believe possible’.53 
 The cross lies at the boundary of affliction, which is also the boundary 
of humanity. By bringing a human subject to the foot of the cross, afflic-
tion positions her on the threshold of human finitude—a threshold 
crossed only by way of pain so thoroughgoing, so penetrating, that it defies 
description. Moreover, while this human subject might be metaphorically 
or metonymically at the foot of Jesus’ cross, she nonetheless feels at a 
complete remove from the divine whom she desires, since affliction 
 
 51. Weil, S., 1966, p. 98. Philippe de Saint Robert describes affliction as ‘a desired and 
creative suffering’ that ‘goes up to death’ (Saint Robert, P., 1999, p. 19, my translation). For 
helpful readings of affliction, see von der Ruhr, M., 2007, pp. 120-41; and, much more 
extended, Athanasiadis, N., 2001. 
 52. Weil, S., 1966, p. 100. Here and subsequently, I use feminine pronouns to refer to 
‘the subject’ since this subject is one that Weil imagined and identified with, personally. 
 53. Weil, S., 1988–, 6.2.313. 
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apophatically ‘renders God absent for a while, more absent than a dead 
person, more absent than light in a completely dark prison’.54 In the void 
of this absence, this human subject stands, waiting, at the foot of the cross. 
 The cross marks the site of Christianity’s tragic pinnacle. As Katherine 
Brueck notes, ‘Christ’s cross constitutes the cornerstone’ of Weil’s tragic 
Christianity, focusing ‘less on the joyous results of Christ’s having been 
crucified than…on the sufferings Christ himself endured’.55 Weil’s 
Christology uniquely entwines Christ’s divinity and humanity in afflic-
tion: for Weil, what matters most about Christ is that he suffers and dies. 
 There, in this emotional physicality, lies the supernatural aspect of 
Christ’s affliction and self-sacrifice. Rather than trying to circumvent or 
eliminate suffering, Weil’s vision of Christianity places suffering at its 
center, with its most acute articulation coming in Jesus’ tragic cry from 
the cross: ‘My God, my God, why have you forsaken me?’56 Weil cites this 
cry again and again in her cahiers, seeing it as the tragic cry and finding in 
it what she identifies as ‘the true proof that Christianity is something 
divine’ and, consequently, locating the divinity of Christianity in Jesus’ 
most human, most mortal, most tragic moment.57 In this way, Christian-
ity’s divine aspect depends on its utterly human aspect, for in Christ’s 
mortal experience of suffering, Christ’s desire for consolation and an end 
to affliction, Christ’s sense of his finite solitude, Weil locates the compel-
ling power of the crucifixion. Hence for her, the cross involves a violent 
‘tearing to pieces [écartèlement]’, a ‘supreme laceration, suffering that no 
other approaches’ since the death of Christ, insofar as he is divine, tears 
God from God. God is torn in and through human mortality: in the 
crucifixion, God self-lacerates; God subjects Godself to affliction; God 
undergoes the cleavage entailed in God’s loving self-sacrifice. 
 This love, Weil writes, ‘of God for us is passion’, a passion realized in 
the crucifixion but a passion already inscribed in the incarnation insofar 
as it involves God’s self-subjugation to a violent écartèlement.58 Weil 
describes this écartèlement—God’s act of tearing Godself apart and 
becoming human—in terms of pathēma, the Greek word used to designate 
 
 54. Weil, S., 1966, p. 102. 
 55. Brueck, K., 1995, pp. 5, 6. 
 56. Mark 15.34 (quoting Psalm 22.1). Though reading Christianity in tragic terms goes 
against the usual hermeneutic grain, Weil is not alone in her reading. See, for example, 
Mack, B., 1991. 
 57. Weil, S., 1988–, 6.2.368; see also 6.3.34. 
 58. Ibid., 6.3.279. 
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the Passion, through which ‘love is modified, submits, suffers’.59 Love 
plays a key role in the passion of crucifixion, which Weil describes as a 
‘marvel of love’ even as it tears God apart.60 How? Because for Weil, God 
is the love between God and God, even when separated—even in the 
separation that leaves Jesus feeling totally abandoned on the cross. The 
suffering and death of God is what, for Weil, demonstrates Christianity’s 
divinity: God’s self-abandonment, captured in Christ’s tragic cry demon-
strates, ‘at the supreme moment of the crucifixion’, such an impassible 
‘abyss of love on both sides’, so that the death of God serves as ‘the most 
marvelous testimony of perfect love’.61 Weil locates this love at the heart 
of Christianity, where love, suffering, and death form for her an insepara-
ble trinity. 
 Hence for Weil, affliction—bound to the cross—names a spiritual 
exercise of suffering love and marks the intersection of humanity and 
divinity. Weil locates the cross ‘at the intersection of creation and 
Creator’, of human being and God, and Christ, as God become mortal, ‘is 
the point of contact, of tangency, between humanity and God’.62 The cross 
is the site of this tangency; the cross is thus a cross and a crossing. The 
intersection of its limbs marks the intersection of humanity and divinity 
and thus the possibility of crossing from one to the other. There, afflicted, 
she is ready to touch this point of tangency between herself and God, to 
be like God crucified, to emulate God’s charitable self-donation and ‘to 
cross…the infinite thickness of time and of space’ as an act of love.63 The 
cross becomes the threshold across which God and this human subject 
pass in their loving traversals toward one another. 
 The cross becomes, in other words, the site and vehicle for decreation 
as apophatic exercise. But Weil’s rendering of affliction inserts a tragic 
component into her extreme imitatio crucis—one that, as its necessary 
precursor, effects the spiritual passage that decreation enacts. Affliction 
thus makes clear that though Weil shares a kinship with apophatic 
thinkers such as Eckhart, her spiritual itinerary takes a markedly different 
path from theirs, as it goes by way of extraordinary suffering and tragic 
 
 59. Weil, S., 1985, p. 55. 
 60. Weil, S., 1966, p. 106. 
 61. Weil, S., 1988–, 6.3.88. 
 62. Weil, S., 1966, p. 121; Weil, S., 1988–, 6.3.258. 
 63. Weil, S., 1988–, 6.3.115. Weil remarks that once this human subject has performed 
this askēsis, ‘the supernatural part of the soul reigns over the natural part not by violence 
but by persuasion, not by will but by desire’ (Weil, S., 1985, p. 31). 
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excess. These divergences come primarily via the different theological and 
spiritual functions of the cross, which for Eckhart and Weil (and others) 
remain importantly linked to a soul’s apophatic undoing. 
 
 
Apophatic Exercise: Decreation 
 
Having done its work on a soul’s temporal created part via an extreme 
uprooting and tragic tearing, the dark night of affliction gives way to the 
‘brilliant darkness’ of decreation. Decreation is the ascetic practice of 
apophasis that concerns the uncreated part, the part Eckhart calls the 
innermost ground, which for him is identical with the divine ground. But 
what Eckhart calls a retreat (of the soul into this innermost ground) Weil 
sees as a passage: a mystical passage from the created to the uncreated. 
Just as, in affliction, a human subject passes by negation, through death, 
so, in decreation, she passes ‘into the uncreated’.64 In so doing, decreation 
achieves a second apophatic level: the negation of negation and subse-
quent passage from the negative to the mystical. 
 I do not mean to assert that decreation lacks a deeply negative dimen-
sion, because negativity is operative, thanks in large part to the preceding 
spiritual exercise of affliction. Affliction spiritually strips a human subject; 
it lacerates her; it brings this subject to the threshold of her mortality and 
leaves her there, exposed, feeling totally abandoned; it brings her, in other 
words, to the threshold of a void. Decreation concerns her passage across 
this threshold and into this void, this abyss of nothingness, and its 
achievement requires that she detach herself from created things, that she 
empty herself, and that she fix her desire and will on the void: ‘to want the 
void, to will the void [vouloir à vide, vouloir le vide]’.65 She must will the 
void; she must desire the void; she must choose the void; she must face 
the void and accept it out of loving self-sacrifice, for to love means ‘to 
endure the void’.66 Moreover, she must not only face the void but create it 
within herself by hollowing out an interior space through an act of self-
negation. In doing so, she follows God, who in the act of creation must 
renounce being everything: ‘God renounces—in a sense—being all’.67 
Creation, then, involves renunciation—self-renunciation—from the 
 
 64. Weil, S., 1988–, 6.2.349-50. For an insightful readings of decreation, see Irwin, A., 
2002, and Radzins, I., 2005. 
 65. Weil, S., 1988–, 6.3.190. 
 66. Ibid., 6.2.207. 
 67. Ibid., 6.2.270. 
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beginning, since for something other than God to exist, God must con-
tract Godself, thus renouncing claim to part of the totality of existence.68 
 Creating a void within herself, a human subject follows God in terms of 
self-contraction, which requires a radical self-tearing, an ‘extreme uproot-
ing [déracinement]’ that makes space for this void, toward which she 
directs her desire.69 This uprooting is so extreme that, in carving out this 
void, she destroys her subjectivity: she obliterates her ability to say ‘I’. She 
must offer her ‘I’ in a self-renunciative imitation of God—because she, as 
a human subject, possesses ‘nothing in the world…except the power to 
say I’.70 Her ‘I’ is all that she has to give to God, making the renunciation 
of human agency also its ultimate act. She creates a void within herself; 
she annihilates her ‘I’, which cedes its place to God.71 Hence Weil’s ethic 
of decreation involves a human subject’s self-annihilation—carving out an 
interior void within herself—and self-donation—giving her ‘I’, the only 
thing she has to give, to God. Thanks to these exercises of self-sacrifice, 
her ‘I’ becomes no longer the individual, finite ‘I’ of this subject but the ‘I’ 
of God. The ethical dimension of decreation yields a mystical outcome in 
which, Weil writes, ‘in a sense, God is “I.”’72 Here Weil’s apophatic anthro-
pology echoes Eckhart’s concerning the identity of the soul’s ground and 
the divine ground, as when Weil writes that ‘the self of God is moreover I. 
Under all possible relations, it is always this which says I’.73 There are also 
Dionysian resonances, since what is at stake is a spoken ‘I’, an ability to 
say ‘I’, that a human subject unsays in sacrificing her ability to say ‘I’. 
Thus in decreation, the linguistic apophasis of negative theology corre-
sponds to the ethical, and finally ontological, apophasis of negative 
anthropology. Decreation is the apophatic exercise that, paired with 
affliction, stands at the culmination of Weil’s spiritual itinerary. Affliction 
corresponds to the tragic while decreation corresponds to the mystical. 
 In decreation, Weil creatively crosses theology and anthropology in a 
spiritual exercise of mystical passage: across a threshold, from created to 
 
 
 68. See also Weil, S., 1966, p. 131. 
 69. Weil, S., 1988–, 6.2.356; see also 6.2.264. Vetö develops a similar point based on 
what he very appropriately calls ‘abnegation’ (Vëto, M., 1994, p. 32). 
 70. Weil, S., 1988–, 6.2.461. 
 71. Ibid., 6.2.467. 
 72. Ibid., 6.2.125. The ontological outcome is also powerfully mystical since, according 
to Weil, total relinquishment of creation makes a decreated subject a co-creator: ‘we 
participate in the creation of the world by decreating ourselves’ (ibid., 6.2.432). 
 73. Ibid., 6.2.483. 
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uncreated. She positions decreation at the culmination of her spiritual 
itinerary so that a spiritual itinerant, advancing along this practical pro-
gression, concludes her journey with decreation, which marks the pinnacle 
of her apophatic expedition, in which she unsays and undoes her subjec-
tivity. This move is from the created to the uncreated, a move across and 
beyond the ontological threshold of humanity. It is the move that this 
human subject has prepared for, but it is not a move that she can make on 
her own. She can create a void within herself; she can make room for God; 
she can sacrifice her ‘I’; but she cannot advance on her own across the 
threshold she desires to cross. 
 She can move only up to the threshold, peering toward the mystical 
void that lies beyond it. Completely uprooted, having given all that she 
has to give, having subjugated herself to the point of self-annihilation, she 
must wait there for God to carry her across. Her ethical subjection opens 
onto a spiritual subjection built into decreation. Hence the passion that 
she experiences in terms of affliction leads to a different passion: a 
passivity, characterized by ‘inactive action [action non agissante]’, that 
leaves this human subject waiting for God to complete her decreation—
since only God can.74 She can bring herself only so far. God must then 
cross the threshold of creation twice: to retrieve this subject and to bring 
her back with God, thereby consummating her passage into the uncreated. 
Decreation therefore requires the passage of God to effect the passage of 
this human subject. 
 These crossings ultimately come out of love, as this human subject 
ceases to be through love. She advances to the threshold out of her love 
for God, driven by her unyielding conviction that ‘after death, love [après 
la mort, l’amour]’.75 After (and thanks to) death as passage beyond her 
created state, love engulfs her in a mystical excess. For Weil, the mystical 
moments of theological and anthropological apophasis operate according 
to love: a human subject’s absolute love for God and God’s absolute love 
for a human subject—to the point that God sacrifices Godself in the self-
donation of incarnation and then crucifixion. Love is what propels, even 
compels, God to overfill the void that a subject creates for this purpose. 
This movement highlights the double sense of passion that opens onto a 
double crossing done out of love, according to a mystic impulse. 
 
 
 74. Ibid., 6.2.351. 
 75. Ibid., 6.2.97. 
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